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Abstract
In response to liquidity crunches in funding markets leading up to the Global Financial Crisis,
the Bank of England introduced Extended-Collateral Long-Term Repo (ELTR) operations,
which were a modified version of the regularly scheduled three-month open market
operations. These operations were conducted by auction and accepted non-sovereign debt
securities, including residential mortgage-backed securities, as collateral. The Bank of
England routinely changed the frequency and size of the ELTRs in response to financial
needs. At the peak, ELTRs occurred weekly with 40 billion British pounds (GBP) available
for eligible institutions, and with GBP 180 billion outstanding. In order to drain this
increased liquidity from the system, the Bank of England introduced the one-week bill, a nonmonetary liability, which reached peak issuance in January 2009 at GBP 100 billion in a
week. The Bank of England transitioned ELTR operations into permanent Indexed LongTerm Repo operations in June 2010, with several tweaks to auction design.
Keywords: Bank of England, ELTR, ILTR, Sterling Monetary Framework, United Kingdom
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modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
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Overview
After the run on and subsequent
nationalization of the British mortgage bank
Northern Rock in September 2007, in the
lead-up to the Global Financial Crisis,
individualized liquidity concerns spread into
a systemic liquidity problem. In response, the
Bank of England attempted to provide
additional liquidity to the banking sector
through adjustments to its regularly
scheduled open market operations (OMOs).
The Bank of England offered term repo
auctions for funds of three-month maturity
with a penalty rate of 100 basis points above
the Bank Rate and an expanded set of eligible
collateral (Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and
Weller 2009; Bank of England 2007b). This
included less-liquid and lower-quality
private-sector
securities,
residential
mortgage-backed
securities,
and
unsecuritized mortgages. Prior to the Global
Financial Crisis, the Bank of England only
accepted highly liquid sovereign debt
securities as collateral in its regular OMOs
and its standing facilities. The Bank of
England offered four of these term repo
auctions in the autumn of 2007, but no banks
participated due to fears that accessing the
funding would associate them with the
Northern Rock collapse (Fisher 2009; Cheun,
von Köppen-Mertes, and Weller 2009).
To overcome the stigma concerns, the Bank of
England announced on December 12, 2007,
that it had decided to remove the penalty rate
from the repo auctions and widen the
collateral eligibility further (Fisher 2009).
Successful bidders paid their own bid rate. It
also announced that, during the previously
scheduled OMOs on December 18, 2007, and
January 15, 2008, the amount of reserves
offered at three-month maturity would be
increased from below 3 billion British pounds
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Key Terms
Purpose: The ELTRs reduced “the economic costs of
disruptions to the commercial banking system’s
provision of liquidity and payments services,” while
assisting “commercial banks in financing assets that
had suddenly become illiquid” (Bank of England
2008k)
Launch Dates

Announcement:
December 12, 2007
Operational:
December 18, 2007

Expiration Dates

June 2010

Legal Authority

Pre-existing Bank of
England authority to
initiate open market
operations

Peak Outstanding

GBP 180 billion in
January 2009

Participants

Regular open market
operations participants

Rate

Discriminatory,
minimum bid
introduced later

Collateral

The ELTRs widened the
usual set of eligible
collateral to include
certain private sector
securities.

Loan Duration

Three-month maturities

Notable Features

The BoE issued oneweek bills to banks to
drain the excess
liquidity

Outcomes

Improving market
conditions and reserve
balances
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(GBP) to GBP 10 billion (below USD 6.15 to 20.5 billion).3 The announcement of the
Extended-Collateral Long-Term Repo (ELTR) operations came in conjunction with similar
measures rolled out by the Federal Reserve and other central banks (Bank of England
2007c). Between 2007 and 2010, the size of funds available in ELTRs ranged from GBP 5
billion to GBP 40 billion, with irregular frequencies of weekly to monthly drawings (Bank of
England 2008g).
The Bank of England expanded the set of eligible collateral for inclusion in ELTRs from
normal OMOs. This expanded set of collateral initially included AAA-rated residential
mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds, and some asset-backed securities. Later
expansions of the eligible collateral included commercial mortgage securitizations and
corporate bonds and loans. These different types of collateral would face specific haircuts to
reflect their value and risk (Breeden and Whisker 2010).
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, an American investment
firm, in September 2008, the Bank of England made several significant changes to the
subsequent ELTRs. The Bank introduced a minimum bid rate, set at the Bank’s overnight
index swap (OIS) rate, while expanding the size of ELTR drawings from GBP 5 billion to GBP
40 billion (Bank of England 2008g). The Bank of England also expanded the eligible set of
collateral several times in the months following the Lehman Brothers collapse.
As the ELTRs increased in size and injected greater liquidity into the banking system than
regular OMOs could drain, the Bank of England created Bank of England one-week bills, a
new type of non-monetary liability offered weekly at a maturity of one-week, in October
2008 (Cross, Fisher, and Weeken 2010; Winters 2012). The Bank of England issued GBP 100
billion of these bills at their peak in January 2009 (Cross, Fisher, and Weeken 2010). Also in
October 2008, the Bank set the minimum bid rate against newly eligible collateral 50 basis
points higher than the OIS rate. The minimum bid against collateral previously eligible for
OMOs remained at the OIS rate (Bank of England 2008h).
The Bank of England transitioned the ELTRs into a permanent instrument called Indexed
Long-Term Repo (ILTR) operations in the Sterling Monetary Framework in June 2010.
Unlike the ELTRs, the ILTRs had a multi-good auction format, with two distinct sets of eligible
collateral. The ILTRs also had a uniform pricing format, in which successful bidders pay the
clearing price rather than their own bid prices (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015).
Summary Evaluation
As the Bank of England refined its pre-existing instruments and introduced new measures
to respond to the financial crisis, the usage of ELTRs slowly declined. Specifically, the
creation of the Asset Purchase Facility in March 2009, which increased liquidity in corporate
funding markets and caused a controlled increase in reserve balances, resulted in a decline
of ELTR usage. Fisher (2009) states that improved market conditions and higher levels of

3

GBP 1 = USD 2.05 on December 12, 2007, according to Yahoo Finance.
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required reserves led to banks not needing further liquidity insurance from ELTR
operations.
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Context: United Kingdom 2007–2008

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$3.095 trillion in 2007
$2.948 trillion in 2008
$50,567 in 2007
$47,287 in 2008
Data for 2007:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system

Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2008:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
$4.884 trillion in 2007
$5.297 trillion in 2008
157.77% in 2007
179.77% in 2008
Data not available for 2007
Data not available for 2008
77% in 2007
79% in 2008
14% in 2007
19% in 2008
1% in 2008
26% in 2010
100% insurance on deposits up to
$4,000; 90% on next $66,000 in
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to
$93,000 after October 2008

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Bank of England intended for the ELTRs to alleviate pressures in
short-term funding markets causing liquidity concerns.
As strains in the short-term funding markets emerged in the second half of 2007, the Bank
of England created the ELTR operations to ease liquidity pressures (Bank of England 2007c).
The Bank of England explained the purpose of the ELTR operations in a consultative paper
(Bank of England 2008k):
By shifting the composition of its open market lending away from the one-week maturity
and towards the three-month maturity, the Bank has helped to provide time for banks,
and the authorities, to address the problems underlying market stress. And by extending
the range of collateral eligible in its three-month repos, the Bank has assisted
commercial banks in financing assets that had suddenly become illiquid.
2. Legal Authority: The Bank of England adjusted its regularly scheduled open
market operations to create the ELTRs, which did not require legislation or
external approval.
The Bank of England maintains an operational framework for implementing its monetary
policy decisions known as the Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF) (Cross, Fisher, and
Weeken 2010). The Bank never refers to specific legislation in any of its discussion of the
SMF, and research could not determine legislation that narrowly authorizes the programs in
the SMF. The Winters Review, which analyzed the Bank’s approach to liquidity provision,
never mentioned legislation or statutory authority, instead focusing on the wide range of
authority vested in the Governor of the Bank (Winters 2012). Therefore, it seems likely that
the Bank is relatively unrestricted in its power to implement lending programs.
Open market operations (OMOs) form part of the SMF, along with reserves and operational
standing facilities (Cross, Fisher, and Weeken 2010). Since the creation of the ELTRs were
only an adjustment of the regularly scheduled OMOs, they did not require additional
legislation or external approval.
3. Part of a Package: The ELTR operations were one of the first of several liquidity
programs the Bank of England introduced to address the Global Financial Crisis.
The Bank of England added further liquidity insurance operations as the Global Financial
Crisis deepened. It created the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) in the aftermath of the collapse
of Bear Stearns (US) in March 2008. The SLS sought to improve the medium-term liquidity
of banks and building societies by allowing them to swap high-quality, but temporarily
illiquid, mortgage-backed and other securities (Fisher 2009).
After the demise of Lehman Brothers, an American investment bank, in September 2008, the
Bank of England created two more programs. In September, the Bank of England and other
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central banks started overnight US dollar repo operations due to “poor liquidity in dollar
inter-bank markets” (Fisher 2009). It initiated the Discount Window Facility in October
2008, which is a permanent bilateral liquidity insurance facility that allows institutions to
perform asset swaps of eligible collateral for government securities (Fisher 2009).
4. Management: The Bank of England managed the ELTR operations.
The ELTR operations functioned under the Bank of England’s Sterling Monetary Framework
(Bank of England 2007d).
5. Administration: ELTRs functioned as a single-good auction with successful
bidders paying what they bid.
The ELTRs initially began as a monthly single-good auction, in which institutions could
borrow central bank reserves against a single pool of eligible collateral (Frost, Govier, and
Horn 2015). The ELTRs replaced the three-month maturities at the regularly scheduled
monthly OMOs (Bank of England 2007d).
On the day of the operation, eligible counterparties typically had a 30-minute window to
submit their bids, with only ten bids allowed (Bank of England 2007d). From there, the Bank
of England would rank counterparties’ bids in descending order by bid. The highest bids
were accepted first, and lower bids would be accepted until all bids had been accounted for,
or the amount of the ELTR had been exhausted. Successful bidders paid what they bid (Frost,
Govier, and Horn 2015).
6. Eligible Participants: Institutions that met the eligibility criteria for regular open
market operations from the Bank of England could participate in ELTRs.
In order to be an eligible counterparty for regular OMOs from the Bank of England, an
institution had to be either a bank or building society eligible for the reserves scheme, or a
bank, building society, or securities dealer “authorised under the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 that [was an] active intermediar[y] in the sterling markets, subject to
standards of prudence and risk” (Bank of England 2008a).4 The ELTRs were available to the
counterparties eligible for regular OMOs (Bank of England 2007c). In October 2008, the Bank
of England said in a consultative paper that it did not anticipate changing the eligibility
criteria for counterparties (Bank of England 2008k).
7. Funding Source: The Bank of England funded the ELTR operations with central
bank reserves, without a set limit on the total program.
The Bank of England exchanged central bank reserves for less liquid eligible collateral in the
repo operations. There was no set overall size for ELTR operations.

A building society is a financial institution owned by its members that provides mortgage loans and savings
accounts.
4
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8. Program Size: The Bank of England routinely changed the size of the ELTR
drawings, which varied from GBP 10 billion at announcement to GBP 40 billion at
its peak in September 2008.
The first ELTR drawing in December 2007 offered GBP 10 billion (Bank of England 2007c).
The Bank of England adjusted the ELTR size when needed, peaking in September 2008 at
GBP 40 billion (Bank of England 2008g). The smallest ELTR occurred after the
announcement of the Special Liquidity Scheme in May 2008 with an offering of GBP 5 billion
(Bank of England 2008d). This ELTR drawing and two subsequent GBP 5 billion auctions
were heavily oversubscribed. Eligible counterparties bid for more than double the amount
the Bank offered. Additionally, Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, causing the
Bank of England to increase the ELTR to GBP 40 billion, which was still oversubscribed.
Participation declined after the initial GBP 40 billion ELTR drawing, and the remaining ELTR
drawings were undersubscribed on average. (See Figure 1 for this dynamic.)
Figure 1: Size of ELTR Bids and Auction Sizes

Source: Bank of England 2010.

9. Individual Participation Limits: Initially, participants could bid only on up to 10%
of the total ELTR drawing, but this would be expanded to 20% later.
The Bank of England placed limits on individual firm usage of the ELTRs. At the creation of
ELTRs, when they were a part of the regularly scheduled OMOs, a counterparty could only
place bids of up to 10% of the total size of OMO on offer, across all maturities (Bank of
England 2007d). As the Bank of England increased the frequency of ELTRs in the aftermath
of the Lehman Brothers collapse, the maximum total size of bids from a single counterparty
increased to 20% of the funds on offer (Bank of England 2008g).
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10. Rate Charged: The Bank of England initially operated as a price-taker during
ELTRs, while later implementing minimum bids.
The ELTRs did not charge a penalty rate, since earlier attempts in the fall of 2007 to include
a penalty rate in some bank programs had led to zero usage (Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and
Weller 2009). The Bank of England accepted the highest bids first and then bids at
successively lower prices until the entirety of the drawing was allocated, with each bidder
paying its own bid (Frost, Govier, and Horn 2015).
In September 2008, the Bank of England established that the minimum allowed bid for future
ELTRs would be the overnight index swap (OIS) rate (Bank of England 2008g). In October
2008, the Bank amended the minimum bid rule. The OIS rate remained the minimum bid
allowed for bids against collateral usually allowed in short-term OMOs. Bids against the
newly expanded set of eligible collateral, which was anything not eligible for regular OMOs,
would face a minimum bid of 50 basis points higher than the OIS rate. Bidders were required
to tell the Bank of England which types of collateral they were holding against their bid. If
they did not, the Bank of England would assume it was the wider type and impose the higher
minimum bid. Bids against the two sets of collateral competed for the same ELTR drawing,
rather than separate auctions. If submitted bids were below the minimum rate, they had to
be amended or were cancelled (Bank of England 2008g).
11. Eligible Collateral: The ELTRs allowed a wider range of collateral than previously
permitted in OMOs, with haircuts based on their risk.
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, the Bank of England only accepted highly rated sovereign
and supranational debt as collateral in its operations (Breeden and Whisker 2010).
Specifically, this included:
Gilts (including gilt strips), UK government foreign currency debt securities, sterling
Treasury bills, Bank of England foreign currency debt securities, and certain sterling and
euro-denominated securities issued by EEA (European Economic Area) central
governments, central banks and major international institutions where the issuing
entity is rated Aa3 or higher by two of the three major ratings agencies (Bank of England
2007a)
In the first (and failed) iteration of the expanded OMOs, the Bank of England expanded this
eligible set of collateral to include private-sector securities, AAA-rated residential mortgagebacked securities (RMBS), non-securitized prime mortgages, and others (Cheun, von
Köppen-Mertes, and Weller 2009).
The creation of ELTRs expanded the original eligible set of collateral for OMOs again to
include AAA-rated (RMBS) and asset-backed securities, backed by credit card receivables,
AAA-rated US GSE debt, and AAA covered bonds (Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and Weller
2009). The securities could be denominated in sterling, euro, US dollars, Australian dollars,
Canadian dollars, Swedish krona, Swiss francs, or Japanese yen (only for Japanese
Government Bonds) (Bank of England 2007c).
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In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the Bank of England further expanded
the eligible set of collateral to include AAA-rated ABSs of corporate and consumer loans,
some types of asset-backed commercial paper, as well as the new bank bonds covered by the
Bank of England’s guarantee scheme (Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and Weller 2009). (See
Appendix A for a deeper description of the eligible collateral expansions.)
The Bank of England announced in December 2007 that three-month repos against the wider
set of collateral allowed would be margined separately from other OMOs.5 The margin ratios
for ELTRs depended on both the type of collateral and the terms of the underlying collateral
(see Figure 2 for an example margin ratio table). As the Bank of England adjusted ELTRs by
increasing the size and eligible collateral set, it would similarly update its margin ratios at
the end of market notices. The Bank of England also added 3 basis points to margin ratios for
securities denominated in non-sterling currencies to allow for currency risk (Bank of
England 2007d).
Figure 2: Sample Margin Ratios

Source: Bank of England 2007d.

12. Loan Duration: The ELTRs consisted of three-month long-term repo operations.
Before the Global Financial Crisis, the Bank of England conducted regular OMOs at three-,
six-, nine-, and 12-month maturities. The Bank of England expanded the eligible set of
collateral and the size for the three-month maturities, creating the ELTRs (Bank of England
2007c).
13. Other Conditions: There were no additional conditions on ELTR drawings.
There were no further notable conditions on ELTR funds.

5

Adjusted collateral value (post-haircut) = collateral value/margin ratio (Bank of England 2007d).
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14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The Bank of England introduced the
one-week Bank of England bill after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which
served to drain the extra reserves in the market as the ELTRs grew in size.
Initially, the Bank of England stated that it intended to offset the additional reserves
provided by the ELTRs by reducing the size of its weekly short-term repo operations. The
initial market notice for the ELTRs mentions the possible need for issuance of Bank of
England sterling bills to account for the increased liquidity (Bank of England 2007d).
The ELTRs provided a significant amount of liquidity—especially in the aftermath of the
Lehman Brothers collapse—and created more central bank reserves than banks could use.
This led the Bank to halt its short-term lending operations, as it could no longer sterilize
them. To drain these excess reserves from the market and limit the impact on monetary
policy, in October of 2008, the Bank of England created the one-week Bank of England bill
(Fisher 2009). This new instrument was a non-monetary liability of the central bank that it
offered weekly and with a maturity of one week. At their peak on January 8, 2009, the Bank
of England issued over GBP 100 billion of one-week Bank of England bills (Cross, Fisher, and
Weeken 2010).
15. Other Options: The Bank of England initially attempted a program similar to the
ELTRs, which included a penalty rate.
In the autumn of 2007, the Bank of England announced four term-repo auctions for funds of
three-month maturities, with a wider than usual set of collateral eligible. These auctions
included a penalty rate of 100 basis points above the Bank Rate, which led to zero bids
(Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and Weller 2009; Fisher 2009). When the Bank of England
announced the ELTRs in December 2007, it removed the penalty rate and widened the set of
eligible collateral even further (Fisher 2009).
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: The original announcement of ELTRs
connected the expanded operations to similar programs in Canada, the European
Union, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
The original announcement of the ELTRs on December 12, 2007, presented the expanded
operations as a joint effort between the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the
Federal Reserve System, and the Swiss National Bank. Additionally, the original
announcement links to similar programs by the Bank of Japan and the Swedish Riksbank, but
the Bank of England does not appear to have directly coordinated with these two central
banks in a similar fashion to the others (Bank of England 2007c).
17. Communication: The Bank of England first announced the ELTRs on December 12,
2007, but did not initially refer to them as an established program.
The Bank of England routinely provided market notices which described design changes to
upcoming ELTR operations. The Bank of England announced the size of ELTRs the Friday
before operations (Bank of England 2008h).
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When the Bank announced the failed auctions in the autumn of 2007, it stated that these
operations would attempt to “alleviate the strains in longer-maturity money markets”
(emphasis added; Bank of England 2007c). However, when the Bank unveiled the first ELTR
operations, it said that the purpose was “to address elevated pressures in short-term
funding markets” (emphasis added; Bank of England 2007d). It is unclear why the phrasing
changed in between iterations, as the Bank mainly removed the penalty rate in announcing
the ELTRs.
18. Disclosure: The Bank of England released anonymous aggregate data on the
results of ELTRs quickly after the operations closed.
The Bank of England announced the results of ELTRs approximately 25 minutes after the 30minute window for bids closed (Bank of England 2007). The reported results included the
total size of bids received, the cover ratio, the lowest and highest accepted rates, the
weighted average accepted rate, the tail length, and the proportion of the total ELTR
allocated to bids at the lowest rate (Bank of England 2010).
The Bank of England has not released individual participant details.
19. Stigma Strategy: Earlier attempts to provide liquidity through adjustments to
regularly scheduled OMOs failed, likely due the inclusion of a penalty rate which
was removed for the ELTRs.
The Bank of England held four term auctions in September–October 2007 which featured
adjustments to the regularly scheduled OMOs, such as an expanded set of collateral.
However, no bids were placed by commercial banks during these four auctions, due to a
penalty rate of 100 basis points above the Bank Rate, and stigma concerns. Institutions
feared that their participation in the term auctions would become public and they could
potentially collapse and face nationalization, as was the case with the mortgage lender
Northern Rock in September 2007 (Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and Weller 2009).
In response to these issues, the Bank of England removed the penalty rate when initiating
the ELTRs. Additionally, the Bank of England reassured commercial banks that their
participation in the ELTRs would not become public when the first two auctions announced
were fully subscribed (Cheun, von Köppen-Mertes, and Weller 2009).
20. Exit Strategy: Although, in the original announcement, the Bank of England had
implied that ELTRs would be a temporary program, in June 2010, it transformed
ELTRs into a permanent program called Indexed Long-Term Repo (ILTR).
The initial announcement of the ELTR operations only provided for two auctions of ELTRs
but stated that extensions could occur depending on market conditions (Bank of England
2007c). The Bank of England periodically extended ELTRs until the creation of ILTR in June
2010 as a permanent facility in the Sterling Monetary Framework (Frost, Govier, and Horn
2015).
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Appendix
Appendix A: Timeline of Collateral Eligible for ELTR Operations
Type of Eligible Collateral

First Allowed

Gilts (including gilt strips); UK government foreign currency debt February 2007
securities; sterling Treasury bills; Bank of England foreign currency debt
securities; and certain sterling and euro-denominated securities issued
by EEA (European Economic Area) central governments, central banks,
and major international institutions where the issuing entity is rated
Aa3 or higher by two of the three major ratings agencies (Bank of
England 2007a, 23)
BBB/Baa or higher G10 or EEA sovereign bonds; A-/A3 or higher debt Failed four auctions in
issued by G10 or EEA government-guaranteed agencies; debt issued by September and October
US GSEs; AAA-rated UK and EEA covered bonds; AAA tranches of UK, US, 2007
and EEA ABS backed by credit cards; UK and EEA RMBS rated AA-Aa3 or
higher; single-name commercial paper; and senior corporate bonds
rated A+/A1 or higher (Bank of England 2007b; Cheun, von KöppenMertes, and Weller 2009)
AA3/AA- or higher G10 sovereign-issued bonds; AAA-rated bonds
issued by G10 government-guaranteed agencies; AAA-rated US GSE
debt; AAA-rated tranches of UK, US, and EEA ABS backed by credit cards;
AAA-rated tranches of UK and EEA RMBS; and AAA-rated UK and EEA
covered bonds (underlying assets can be public sector debt or
mortgages) (Bank of England 2007d)

December 12, 2007
(this
completely
replaces the earlier set
of expanded collateral
for the four failed
auctions; hence the
overlap)

AAA-rated tranche of UK, US, and EEA prime ABS (backed by student October 3, 2008
loans, consumer loans, auto loans, and certain equipment leases); AAArated tranche of UK, US, and EEA CMBS; AAA-rated UK, US, and EEA
covered bonds with underlying commercial mortgage assets; AAA-rated
tranche of UK, US, and EEA securitized portfolios of senior secured or
on-balance sheet, high quality corporate loans; AAA-rated tranche of UK,
US, and EEA securitized portfolios of corporate bonds rated A3/A- or
higher; and some types of UK, US, and EEA asset-backed commercial
paper with the highest short-term ratings (Bank of England 2008h)
Debt guaranteed by HM Government’s bank debt guarantee scheme October 8, 2008
(Bank of England 2008i)

Copyright 2022 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to receive
permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program on Financial
Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

1107

